The impact of technology on displacement and reemployment by Daniel Aaronson & Kenneth Housinger
14 Economic Perspectives
The impact of technology on displacement
and reemployment
Daniel Aaronson is an economist and Kenneth
Housinger is an associate economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. The authors thank Jim
Sullivan for research assistance.
Introduction and summary
The U.S. economy is booming, with 30-year lows in
the unemployment rate, historical highs in labor force
participation, and the lowest displacement rates (a
measure of the incidence of involuntary job loss) in a
decade. Displacement rates are especially low among
groups, such as blue-collar workers, that have tradi-
tionally been most vulnerable to displacement. How-
ever, many groups may still be feeling the bite of the
drawn-out corporate restructuring of the early- and mid-
1990s. For example, The Wall Street Journal recently
described the difficulty experienced by some older pro-
fessional workers in finding new employment follow-
ing the mass layoffs of the early 1990s (Horwitz, 1998).
Recent studies document trends in job displace-
ment ratios and related anxiety among workers with at
least five years of job tenure (Aaronson and Sullivan,
1998a, b). Like other work that analyzes job displace-
ment, these studies focus more on the demographic
determinants and consequences of displacement
than on the fundamental causes of layoffs. Yet very
little is known about the causes of displacement, par-
ticularly the roles of technological change, increased
foreign competition, changes in domestic demand,
low productivity within an otherwise growing sector
of the economy, poor management, regulatory changes,
or regional or national recession (Kletzer, 1998). Under-
standing the causes of displacement is important for
policymakers charged with designing job search assis-
tance, retraining, relocation allowances, and other
programs to aid displaced workers. For example, a
stronger case for training subsidies could be made
for workers who are displaced due to technological
reasons. Although research on the benefits of gov-
ernment training finds little return to such programs
(relative to their cost), it is possible that the impact is
more significant for workers displaced because of
technology.1  At a minimum, a relationship between
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displacement and technology contributes to a vast
literature that shows the importance of education and
training throughout a persons career.
Furthermore, the relationship between technology
and displacement is important in understanding gov-
ernments role in restricting natural job flows, say
through the imposition of policies such as mandated
severance packages in Europe intended to provide
higher job security. In a technologically dynamic
environment, labor markets need to be able to react to
shifts in industry skill demands. While a case could
be made for job security provisions if job destruction
were due to poor management, unnecessarily con-
straining labor mobility in technologically innovative
industries is likely to curtail long-run employment
growth (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).
In this article, we seek to fill a gap in the displace-
ment literature by exploring the implications of techno-
logical change for job displacement and reemployment.
We describe some reasons technological innovation
might affect displacement and argue that the labor
market status of less skilled and older workers might
be particularly influenced by technology. We use
several different datasets, including the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Displaced Worker Survey (DWS), to
test whether high-tech sectors are more likely to dis-
place workers and, conditional on such displacement,
whether these workers find it more difficult than their
peers in low-tech industries to reenter the labor market.
Our results provide evidence that industry-
specific technological innovation affects the proba-
bility of displacement and reemployment. However,15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
many of the results are not robust to the particular
measure, or proxy, of technology used. This is not
surprising since our technology proxies are from five
different data sources, often do not cover the same
industries, and cover a variety of topics, including
computer usage, computer investment, productivity
growth, and research and development (R&D) activi-
ty. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence that dis-
placement due to the elimination of positions is more
likely in high-tech industries, consistent with the
notion that job destruction (and creation) is more
common in technologically dynamic industries. How-
ever, there is less evidence of a correlation between
technology and other forms of displacement, notably
plant closings. Furthermore, we find no support for
the hypothesis that the technologydisplacement
relationship disproportionately affects low-skilled or
older workers.
Our reemployment results also vary depending
on the technology proxy employed. However, our pre-
ferred variables, based on industry computer usage
and R&D activity, show that increases in technology
decrease the likelihood of finding new employment
post-displacement. Less skilled, and to a lesser extent,
older workers appear to have more difficulty finding a
new job after displacement in such industries. These
results point to the importance of general education
and training in reducing the uncertainty associated
with job loss. However, we find no evidence that in-
dustry technology matters to the probability of reem-
ployment when other reasonable technology proxies,
such as those based on productivity or computer
investment, are used.
Research on displacement and
reemployment
One important reason for researchers growing
interest in involuntary job loss over the past decade
has been the availability of nationally representative
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Displaced
Worker Survey (DWS), which began in 1984. In the
DWS, a worker is considered displaced if she has an
established work history (many researchers require a
long history within the firm as well) and has lost her
job for reasons not related to performance, such as a
company layoff or plant closing. Voluntary quits, fir-
ings for poor performance, and temporary layoffs are
not considered displacement. Thus far, most research
has centered on two important issues: 1) Who gets
displaced; and 2) What happens to these workers
after displacement?
A number of studies have analyzed the size and
characteristics of the displaced worker population.
Recent examples are Farber (1997), Kletzer (1998), and
Aaronson and Sullivan (1998a, b). These studies find
that workers in blue-collar occupations, who have
less education, or who work in production industries
have experienced the brunt of involuntary job loss
over the last 20 years. However, Aaronson and Sullivan
(1998b) find that displacement has become somewhat
more democratic during the 1990s expansion. High-
seniority workers who were highly educated, were
in white-collar jobs, or were employed in service-
producing industries had been relatively immune to
displacement prior to 1990. But during the early 1990s,
displacement rates for these groups rose particularly
fast, while those for some groups with high rates of
displacement in the 1980s rose less or even fell.
Other studies analyze the cost of involuntary job
loss by looking at the reemployment and earnings
losses of displaced workers. Involuntary job loss can
carry a substantial cost to workers because of the
loss of job-, firm-, or industry-specific skills and expe-
rience (what economists call human capital). Workers
who have been at their jobs for many years accumu-
late human capital that may improve their productivity
and, hence, their wages. However, after a job loss,
these workers may have to accept wage cuts if prospec-
tive employers do not value, and will not pay for, this
job- or firm-specific human capital.2 Likewise, workers
who switch industries may suffer earnings losses due
to the loss of industry-specific human capital (Fallick,
1993; Neal, 1995). Kletzer (1989), Ruhm (1991), and
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) demonstrate
that involuntary job loss is in fact costly, at least for
workers who have attained significant tenure.3 For ex-
ample, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan found that
even six years after job loss, earnings losses among a
sample of Pennsylvania workers displaced in the ear-
ly 1980s were equal to about 25 percent of their pre-
displacement earnings levels. Recent work, including
Stevens (1997) and Farber (1997), confirms these re-
sults for nationally representative samples.
Understanding the fundamental causes
of displacement
While the research cited above has contributed
significantly to our understanding of the impact of
involuntary job loss, little work has been done on the
fundamental causes of displacement. The importance
of this research need is best summarized by Kletzer
(1998), who notes that ones perception of displaced
workers is surely shaped by whether the underlying
reason for their job loss is technological change, in-
creasing foreign competition, changes in domestic
demand, low productivity within an otherwise growing
sector of the economy, poor management, regional or
national recession, or some other reason.16 Economic Perspectives
Of the reasons mentioned by Kletzer, only the
rise of foreign trade has been studied. The intuition
behind the tradedisplacement link is that industries
facing increased import competition experience falling
import prices and a decline in domestic labors mar-
ginal revenue product. To stem the loss in domestic
demand for labor resulting in a decline in productivity,
wages must fall. If prices fall far enough that produc-
tion becomes unprofitable, firms close plants, result-
ing in mass layoffs. Alternatively, wages may not fall
enough because of some rigidity in the labor market,
resulting in smaller-scale layoffs. Several papers, in-
cluding Haveman (1994), Kletzer (1997), and Addison,
Fox, and Ruhm (1995), find evidence of a correlation
between import competition and domestic displace-
ment rates, although much of this effect is driven by
a few import-sensitive industries such as apparel,
footwear, and textiles.
Another reason for job displacement is techno-
logical change.4 Firms in which there are frequent
changes in processes and equipment must continual-
ly retrain their employees. Training is expensive, even
more so for employees who are difficult to retrain. As a
result, firms in which the implementation of technolo-
gy is relatively ubiquitous or which are undergoing
speedy technological improvements are likely to shift
their work force from those with a high cost of train-
ing to those with a low cost of training (Bartel and
Sicherman, 1998). Alternatively, firms may substitute
expensive-to-train employees with labor-saving ma-
chinery or equipment. This shift is likely to negative-
ly affect certain expensive-to-train groups of workers,
including low-skilled or older workers or those with-
out previous training. Older workers may also be re-
placed because a firm receives smaller incremental
increases in future revenues from training older em-
ployees because it has fewer years to recoup the cost
of training. In addition, Kremer and Thomson (1998)
suggest that high-technology firms may shift away
from older workers because workers of different ages
may have comparative advantages in different tasks.
For example, older workers may be better managers
given their extensive work experience, and younger
workers might be better technicians and programmers
because their recent education might allow them to
adapt more readily to new equipment and technolo-
gies. Therefore, shifts toward a more technical work
force (and less middle management) might result in
the displacement of older workers. Similarly, a lack of
training and education among less skilled workers
may reduce their productivity, further reducing the
demand for such workers (Baumol and Wolff, 1998).
The drop in demand for expensive-to-train work-
ers can play out in two ways. First, firms can displace
workers deemed to have high training-costs. There-
fore, we look at whether the probability of involuntary
job loss is higher in industries with higher levels of
technology and whether older and less skilled workers
are more likely to experience the brunt of this displace-
ment activity. Second, high-technology firms can hire
fewer high-training-cost workers. There is some evi-
dence, albeit mixed, that relative utilization of skilled
workers is positively correlated with capital intensity
and the use of new technology.5 That is, plants and
industries that implement technology are more likely
to employ skilled labor. We look at one aspect of the
hiring effect by analyzing the post-reemployment pat-
terns of displaced workers. With fewer jobs available
to high-training-cost workers, reemployment is more
difficult and earnings losses are exacerbated, espe-
cially among those looking for employment in high-
technology industries. Therefore, not only are older
and low-skilled workers more likely to be displaced
than other workers in high-technology industries,
they may find reemployment more difficult.
In this article, we examine only one reemployment
outcome: the impact of technology on finding a new
job. How long it took these workers to find a new job
and at what cost, in terms of lower earnings, are left
for future research.
Data and empirical strategy
Our sample consists of workers age 30 to 59 from
two supplements of the Current Population Survey
(CPS): the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) and the
tenure survey. The DWS is a nationally representative
random survey of workers conducted in January or
February of even years from 1984 to 1998. The DWS
broadly defines displacement as involuntary job loss
not related to worker performance. Therefore, displace-
ment does not include quits or workers discharged
for poor performance. The surveys are retrospective,
asking individuals whether they have experienced job
loss any time over the last five years in the 1984 to
1992 surveys and over the last three years in the 1994
to 1998 surveys. Thus, our earliest information on
displacement is for 1979 and our latest is for 1997.
However, we do not use the earliest DWS (1984) and
CPS tenure supplement (1983) because of problems
with the employment and industry codes.
For workers who report that they were displaced
in the relevant period, the DWS asks for the specific
reason for their displacement. The possible responses
are: plant or company closed down or moved, insuffi-
cient or slack work, position or shift abolished, sea-
sonal job completed, self-operated business failed,
and some other reason. The list is less than ideal.
For example, insufficient work might be the reason17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
why one of the other events occurred. A plant may
have closed because there was insufficient work to
do. Position or shift abolishment is supposed to cover
instances of corporate downsizing, but it is possible
that those in nine-to-five work environments will be
confused by the reference to shifts. In any case, it
lumps together instances of complex reengineering
exercises, which presumably reflect long-run organi-
zational changes, with closings of shifts in factories,
which are more likely to be associated with short-run
declines in demand. The seasonal job and self-employ-
ment categories do not correspond to many peoples
conception of job displacement and, in fact, make up
only a trivial fraction of the job loss data we consider.
Finally, perhaps because of some of the ambigu-
ities of the displacement reason categories, some
other reason is a common response, accounting for
a large fraction of the total growth of displacement of
high-seniority workers during the 1990s. As it turns
out, many workers reporting other reasons for job
loss were probably not displaced. In a Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) debriefing of displaced workers from
the February 1996 survey, only 20 percent to 30 percent
of respondents who had answered other gave rea-
sons that could be categorized as displacement.6
Because it is not obvious how to construct a time-con-
sistent displacement series using the other category,
we focus on the first three displacement categories:
plant or company closed down or moved, insufficient
work, and position or shift abolished.
The first difficulty we face in constructing a con-
sistent measure of worker displacement is that the
DWS only collects information, such as the year of
displacement, the workers tenure, and other character-
istics of the lost job, for one incident of displacement
over the relevant period. Workers displaced twice or
more in the same period are instructed to answer the
additional questions for the lost job in which they had
the highest tenure. This inevitably leads to some un-
dercounting of incidents of displacement (Stevens,
1997). Moreover, as Farber (1997) notes, the change
in the length of the period over which the DWS asks
workers to report on displacement creates a problem
of comparability over time, because the undercount-
ing problem is more severe when the interval covered
is five years long.
Our approach is to restrict our analysis to inci-
dents of job displacement in which the affected workers
had five or more years of tenure. Obviously, it is not
possible to lose two such jobs in one three- or five-
year interval. Thus, if workers respond accurately to
the survey, the number of such job loss incidents in
a year will be correctly tallied no matter whether the
year is part of a three- or five-year interval in the
DWS. Of course, we will miss all displacement inci-
dents in which workers had less than five years of
tenure. However, the consequences of job loss are
not likely to be particularly great for workers who
have little tenure and, thus, our measure may capture
the most important forms of job displacement.7
To explore the impact of demographic and tech-
nological factors on displacement, we need a sample
of workers who are not displaced. Because we restrict
the sample of displaced workers to those with at least
five years of tenure, we can only use respondents who
are asked about job tenure.
We extract the job tenure data from the CPS tenure
supplements conducted in January or February of
1987, 1991, 1996, and 1998.8 With the exception of
the 1994 DWS, each of the tenure supplements corre-
sponds within one year to a DWS supplement. To
account for business cycle changes in displacement
rates, we do not include DWS surveys without a
matching tenure supplement.
The final sample includes roughly 94,000 work-
ers, but the regression samples vary depending on
the technology proxy we use. This is because some
of the technology measures cover a limited number of
industries. Panel A of appendix 1 gives unweighted
descriptive statistics for the sample of workers that
are included in the displacement or reemployment
analysis and that match to one of our technology
measures, industry computer usage. Approximately
10 percent of these workers are from the DWS (and
therefore are displaced). However, this is not the
annual displacement rate; it is based on whether dis-
placement occurred in the previous three- or five-year
period. Approximately 79 percent of the displaced
sample had obtained new employment by the survey
date. Of those who were displaced two or more years
prior to the survey date, approximately 88 percent
had obtained new employment.
Technology measures
We link the DWS and the tenure supplements
to a variety of proxies of industry-specific rates of
technological change.9 We use five different proxies
because no single measure perfectly describes tech-
nology usage. They are:
n employee computer usage,
n investment in computer equipment,
n total factor productivity (TFP),
n output per hour (labor productivity), and
n a list of high-technology industries based on the
share of R&D employees from Luker and Lyons
(1997) article in the Monthly Labor Review (MLR
high-tech).18 Economic Perspectives
Below, we describe these variables in more detail.
Descriptive statistics are reported in panel B of appen-
dix 1. Other variables that have been employed in the
literature, such as the National Science Foundation
data on R&D spending, scientist employment, or
patent data, are not used (directly) here because they
are typically restricted to one or two sectors.10 We
use the R&D data indirectly through the MLR high-
tech indicator.
We follow Bartel and Sicherman (1998) in exploit-
ing only the cross-sectional nature of the technology
proxies. When multiple years of data are available, as
they are for many of the variables, we usually average
across years.11 This reduces the amount of measure-
ment error in our already imperfect proxies. However,
an alternative and interesting way to explore the data
would be to use the time-series variation as a measure
of the change in technological usage within industries.
Our first technology proxy measures the share of
employees who are computer users in each industry.
The data are compiled in Autor, Katz, and Krueger
(1998) using the October 1993 CPS. As part of the
Education Supplements, the CPS survey asked work-
ers whether they use a computer at work, defining a
computer as a desktop terminal or PC and not a hand-
held data device or electronic cash register. Since an
affirmative response only requires use of a keyboard,
it may not be a perfect measure of actual computer
users; a programmer is counted the same way as a
data entry operator. Furthermore, technological im-
provements that are not related to keyboard usage
are ignored. Still, this variable is appealing because it
provides data for virtually the entire economy and it
attempts to measure the spread of computer technol-
ogy as an explanation for skill-biased change. Many
analysts argue that the computer revolution is the
most viable explanation for increases in technology
over this period.
Our second measure of the spread of computer
technology is an industrys share of investment in
computer equipment. These data are reported in the
1992 industry census reports of four major industry
groups: manufacturing, retail trade, wholesale trade,
and services. Like the computer usage variable, this
variable attempts to proxy for the computer revolution.
It has a further advantage over R&D or scientist
measures in that it measures actual usage rather than
potential usage. It is, however, limited in its coverage
of industries.
The next two technology proxies are productivi-
ty measures. The total factor productivity (TFP) data
are from the National Bureau of Economic Researchs
manufacturing productivity database, described in
Bartelsman and Gray (1996). TFP as a proxy of techno-
logical progress has firm roots in economics, dating
back to the seminal work of Robert Solow in the 1950s.
TFP is the portion of output growth unexplained by
labor, energy, or capital input growth. As a residual,
it is an amalgamation of all of the unmeasured factors
contributing to growth. Therefore, it is a rough, albeit
well-utilized, measure of technological change. How-
ever, an important disadvantage of the TFP data is that
they are restricted to manufacturing firms.12 Because of
concern about the volatility of the data, we use indus-
try TFP averaged between 1980 and 1994.
Our second productivity measure is output per
hour (labor productivity), as calculated by the BLS.
The BLS productivity data include sectors in mining,
manufacturing, transportation, trade, finance, and
services, but exclude many sectors.13 We average the
productivity data between 1987 and 1996.
Finally, we use a list of high-technology indus-
tries compiled in a recent article in the Monthly Labor
Review (MLR) (Luker and Lyons, 1997).14 The list is
based on earlier work by Hadlock, Hecker, and Gannon
(1991), who used the BLS Occupational Employment
Statistics Survey to identify R&D-intensive indus-
tries in which the number of R&D workers was at least
50 percent higher than the average proportion of all
industries surveyed. As such, this measure picks up
another common indicator of industry-wide technolo-
gy implementation, the use of R&D and patents.
Clearly, all of these industry measures suffer from
the same aggregation problem. Although we use rela-
tively detailed industry sectors, we cannot hope to
identify the important within-industry differences in
technological usage. A striking example is the com-
puter programming, data processing, and other com-
puter-related services industry,15 which most would
consider a high-technology industry.16 However, this
industry includes both high-tech and low-tech sectors,
combining hardware and software programmers with
keypunch services. Note that our measure of comput-
er usage could conceivably count as many computer
users in a data-processing firm as in a state-of-the-art
computer-programming firm. As a result of the limita-
tions of the DWS and tenure surveys, our analysis
misses important subtleties about the role of technol-
ogy and displacement.
A second general concern is that the technology
measures may be credited with too much information
about industry trends. Since we do not control for
cross-sectional factors, such as trend output growth,
that could be correlated with both displacement and
technology usage, our estimates of the impact of
technology may be biased. However, we include year
indicators, allowing us to isolate the importance of19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
economy-wide trends. Furthermore, in much of the
analysis to follow, we control for the major industry
(say manufacturing versus services, as opposed to
computer services versus health services), allowing
for fundamental industry differences to be measured.
Box 1 describes our empirical approach to testing
the relationship between technology and displacement
and reemployment. The basic idea is to relate demo-
graphically adjusted industry displacement and reem-
ployment rates to industry technology
characteristics. The regression results are first report-
ed with the full sample. To test whether displacement
and reemployment probabilities vary with age and
skills, we also stratify the sample based on age and
BOX 1
Empirical strategy
To test the relationship between technology and
displacement and reemployment, we employ a
simple regression framework. In each period, a
worker reports whether she has been displaced
in the previous three (or five) years, and, if so,
whether she has been reemployed since the dis-
placement. The displacement analysis relates
whether the individual has been displaced, as
denoted by Y ijt, to a group of demographic vari-
ables and industry technology measures
1) YX T ijt ijt j t ijt =+ + ++ ab d ee ,
where i indexes individuals, j indexes industries,
and t indexes time. Xijt is a vector of individual
demographic variables such as age, race, educa-
tion, and gender. The variable T is the rate of
technological implementation in industry j. Note
that the subscript on T does not include t since
the technology measures have no time dimen-
sion; they have been averaged across years.
The et term picks up the unobserved component
of displacement likelihood that is due to the year
of the survey. Therefore, this error term controls
for business cycle effects on displacement. The
eijt  term is the residual, or unexplained portion, of
the equation.
Of those displaced individuals, we look at
whether they are reemployed by the survey date.
We ascertain reemployment using a question on
how many jobs the worker has had since being
displaced. If she answers one or more or reports
being employed at the survey date, we code her
as reemployed. To measure the impact of the
industry technology variables on the likelihood
of reemployment, we run an analogous regres-
sion to equation 1 but substitute the dependent
variables
2) RX T D ijt ijt j ijt t ijt =+ + + ++ ab d je e ,
where R
ijt is equal to one if the displaced worker
has found new employment and zero if she
remains jobless by the CPS survey date. To ac-
count for differences in the length of time since
displacement, the variable Dijt records the interval, in
years, between displacement and the survey date.
Because the dependent variable in both
equations 1 and 2 can only equal zero or one, we
estimate these regressions using a probit frame-
work, a technique that is commonly employed for
discrete choice analysis. The probit model is
based on a regression where the worker is, say,
either displaced (Y = 1) or not displaced (Y = 0).
This is estimated as
Prob[ ] ( ). YX T ii j == + 1 Fb d
From the probit results, we report partial de-
rivatives, which give the change in the probabili-
ty of an outcome (say, displacement) with respect
to a change in some explanatory variable. For a








() , fb d b
where f is the standard normal density function.
In the case of the technology measures, the inde-
pendent variables are measured at their mean
values. However, since many of our independent
variables are 01 dummy indicators, these deriva-
tives are calculated as the difference between the
cell probabilities when the event occurs (say, a
college graduate) and when the event does not
occur (not a college graduate):
Prob Prob [| , ] [| , ] , Y iX Y iX = ¢ -= ¢ 10
where  ¢ X ,1 is the vector of covariates where the
college graduate variable is set to one and  ¢ X ,0
is the vector of covariates where the college
graduate variable is set to zero. All derivatives are
calculated at the base case of a 30- to 34-year-old
white male with a high school education in 1998.20 Economic Perspectives
education groups. Therefore, in the case of skills, we
estimate two separate displacement regressions, one
for sample respondents who do not graduate from
college and one for those who do. In the case of age,
we estimate separate regressions for workers aged 30
to 39, 40 to 49, and 50 to 59.17
Relationship between technology
and displacement
Table 1 reports our basic findings on the demo-
graphic determinants of displacement, including age,
education, race, gender, and time. Each column reports
results from a separate analysis. In column 1, the depen-
dent variable is whether the individual has lost his job
due to a plant closing, slack or insufficient work, or
position or shift abolished. The remaining
columns look at each reason separately.
The numbers (partial derivatives) in
table 1 indicate the change in the proba-
bility of an outcome for each of the list-
ed demographic control characteristics,
relative to the base case (a white male,
age 30 to 34, with a high school education
in 1998). Since the demographic charac-
teristics can only take on values of zero
or one, we evaluate the change in each
explanatory variable by turning the vari-
ables on and off. For example, the age
35 to 39 row evaluates the change in the
probability of the base case individuals
chance of being displaced if all that is
changed is that he is 35 to 39 instead of
the base case of 30 to 34. In this case,
column 1 shows that being age 35 to 39
decreases the probability of job displace-
ment by 0.7 percentage points (with a
standard error of 0.2 percentage points)
relative to a 30- to 34-year-old worker.
Column 1 shows that some workers
are more prone to displacement. For our
purpose, two observations are worth em-
phasizing. First, older workers are less
likely to be displaced than younger
workers. Moving from the 30 to 34 age
group to the 40 to 44 age group decreases
the probability of involuntary job loss
for high-tenure workers by roughly 1.6
percentage points. The decline becomes
1.8 percentage points by age 50 to 54.
Likewise, less educated workers are
more likely to be displaced. High school
dropouts are 3.3 percentage points more
likely to lose their job relative to high
school graduates, while college graduates are 2.8 per-
centage points less likely to lose their job relative
to high school graduates. The year indicators at the
bottom of the table capture both business cycle dimen-
sions and survey effects. Since multiple tenure and
DWS surveys are coded together (that is, the 1986 to
1988 dummy includes the 1987 tenure survey and the
1986 and 1988 DWS), the derivatives should not be
interpreted as pure business cycle effects.18 See
Aaronson and Sullivan (1998a, b) or Faber (1997) for
analysis of displacement trends and their relationship
to the business cycle.
Some interesting differences arise when we
report the displacement results separately for each
of the three reasons (see table 1, columns 2 to 4).
TABLE 1
Probability of displacement, by reason
All Plant Slack Position
Displacement closing work abolished
Age 35–39 –0.007* –0.004* –0.004* 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 40–44 –0.016* –0.006* –0.007* –0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 45–49 –0.014* –0.006* –0.006* –0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 50–54 –0.018* –0.007* –0.008* –0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 55–59 –0.016* –0.006* –0.008* 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
High school dropout 0.033* 0.019* 0.011* –0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Some college –0.006* –0.007* –0.002* 0.005*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
College graduate –0.028* –0.019* –0.008* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Black –0.004 –0.003 0.000 –0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Hispanic 0.005 0.005* 0.003 –0.003*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Other race –0.008 –0.004 0.003 –0.004*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Female –0.010* –0.002* –0.007* 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year 1986–88 0.085* 0.060* 0.033* 0.002*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Year 1990–92 0.092* 0.061* 0.031* 0.007*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Year 1996 0.032* 0.007* 0.025* 0.005*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Log likelihood         –26,501        –16,444         –9,315      –8,672
*significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Partial derivatives are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
See text and box 1 for an explanation. Each column represents a separate
regression. Sample size is 94,155.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
For one thing, older workers are relatively unlikely (but
not by much) to lose a job because of a plant closing
or slack work but not from a position or shift being
abolished, our favored explanation of the corporate
downsizing that hit many industries in the 1990s.
Likewise, less educated workers are more prone to
plant closings and slack work but actually less likely
to be hit by a position or shift abolishment.19  Given
the demographic differences between the three job
loss reasons, position abolished appears to be a dif-
ferent phenomenon from other reasons for involun-
tary job loss, hitting higher educated, white-collar
workers. These results are in line with those of other
researchers who have looked at the determinants of
displacement using different samples of
nondisplaced workers (for example,
Farber, 1997).
In table 2, we add the five measures
of technology to the displacement anal-
ysis reported in table 1. Each cell of the
table is from a separate regression; the
technology measures are added individ-
ually to the basic equation. (Because
many of the technology measures are not
reported for certain industries, the sam-
ple sizes vary across equations; see col-
umn 3.) The first five rows report results
when the dependent variable is displace-
ment for any of the three reasons, and
the bottom five rows report results when
position abolished is the dependent vari-
able. Column 1 adds the technology mea-
sures to the exact specification used
previously, and column 2 adds major
industry controls to column 1.
The results using all displacement
as the dependent variable vary depend-
ing on the technology proxy employed.20
In the case of output per hour and the
MLR high-tech indicator, increases in
technology increase industry displace-
ment rates. For example, row 3, column 2
of table 2 shows that being in an MLR
high-tech industry increases the dis-
placement rate by 0.6 percentage points
(with a standard error of 0.3 percentage
points). When industry controls are in-
cluded, working in an industry with high
computer investment also significantly
increases the likelihood of displacement.
Without industry controls, increases in
computer usage and TFP actually decrease
displacement. With industry controls,
the impact of computer usage on dis-
placement rates is positive, though not statistically
different from zero.
The numbers at the bottom of table 2 point to a
more robust resultthe technology proxies are con-
sistently correlated with a higher chance of position
abolishment, regardless of whether industry controls
are included. In every case, the technology effect is
significant at the 5 percent level. The computer in-
vestment and usage results are particularly strong,
suggesting that a 10 percent increase in industry
usage or investment leads to an approximately 1.8
percentage point increase in the likelihood of having
your position abolished. These results provide evi-
dence that the elimination of positions is more likely
TABLE 2
Full sample Sample size
All displacement
Computer usage –0.020* 0.009 92,898
(0.003) (0.006)
Computer investment 0.007 0.078* 39,667
(0.008) (0.010)
MLR high-tech 0.038* 0.006* 93,536
(0.002) (0.003)
Output per hour 0.003* 0.005* 36,025
(0.001) (0.001)
Total factor productivity –0.004* –0.004* 19,780
(0.002) (0.002)
Position abolished
Computer usage 0.012* 0.018* 92,898
(0.001) (0.002)
Computer investment 0.009* 0.017* 39,667
(0.003) (0.004)
MLR high-tech 0.005* 0.003* 93,536
(0.001) (0.001)
Output per hour 0.0010* 0.0007* 36,025
(0.0002) (0.0003)




*significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Partial derivatives are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
See text and box 1 for an explanation. Each cell represents results from a
separate regression. For all displacement, dependent variable is one if
individual lost job because of plant closing, slack work, or position or shift
abolished, zero otherwise. See text for details. For position abolished,
dependent variable is one if individual lost job because of position or shift
abolished, zero otherwise. Computer usage is the fraction of workers that
use a computer keyboard from the 1993 October CPS supplement. Computer
investment is the share of investment in computer equipment from the 1992
Census of industries. MLR high-tech is the Monthly Labor Review’s high-tech
industries from Luker and Lyons (1997). Growth in output per hour is from the
U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, averaged over 1987
to 1996. Growth in total factor productivity is from the National Bureau of
Economic Research’s manufacturing productivity database, averaged over
1980 to 1994.
Effect of technology on displacement:
Probability of displacement, by reason22 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 3
Effect of technology on displacement, by education
No college degree College graduates
Sample size Sample size
All displacement
Computer usage –0.022* 0.000 65,846 –0.009 0.043* 27,052
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
Computer investment 0.014 0.074* 29,648 –0.012 0.061* 10,019
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)
MLR high-tech 0.030* –0.002 66,308 0.043* 0.032* 27,228
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Output per hour 0.003* 0.005* 29,693 0.001 0.003 6,332
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Total factor productivity –0.003 –0.003 16,302 –0.008 –0.008 3,478
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Position abolished
Computer usage 0.012* 0.017* 65,846 0.014* 0.029* 27,052
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
Computer investment 0.013* 0.019* 29,648 0.003 0.024* 10,019
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
MLR high-tech 0.004* 0.002* 66,308 0.011* 0.007 27,228
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Output per hour 0.0010* 0.0009* 29,693 0.0009 –0.0002 6,332
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Total factor productivity 0.002* 0.002* 16,302 0.000 0.000 3,478
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Includes major industry
controls no yes no yes
*significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Partial derivatives are reported with standard errors in parentheses. See text and box 1 for an explanation.
See table 2 and text for details and sources of technology measures.
in high-tech industries, but other forms of displacement,
notably plant closings, are not.
Tables 3 and 4 stratify the sample to test whether
low-skilled and older workers are particularly suscep-
tible to displacement in high-tech industries. Columns
1 and 2 of table 3 report the results for a sample of
workers who do not have college degrees and columns
4 and 5 show comparable results for a sample of col-
lege graduates. If less skilled workers are more likely
to be displaced in high-tech industries, we would ex-
pect to see larger derivatives in column 1 than column
4 and column 2 than column 5. However, we find no
evidence that such a pattern exists. In fact, the college
graduate derivatives are sometimes significantly big-
ger than the non-college graduate derivatives.
Table 4 stratifies the sample based on the age of
the worker. Again, we expect to see larger, positive
derivatives for the older workers. This appears to be
the case for some of the position abolished results,
including computer usage and output per hour, but
not for others. Therefore, we conclude that, while
some evidence exists that high-tech industries are
more likely to displace workers, there is no consistent
evidence that this effect disproportionately affects
low-skilled or older workers.21
We performed a number of additional tests on
the results. First, we reran all of the displacement
regressions using just the 1990 to 1998 surveys to
see if the impact of technology has increased in the
1990s relative to the 1980s. The results are very simi-
lar and, therefore, we conclude that there is little evi-
dence that the impact of technology on displacement
has changed much between the two decades. Second,
because of concern that the age 50 to 59 group may
be retiring, we reran the displacement analysis for the
age groups 50 to 54 and 55 to 59. The results are simi-
lar across age groups, with the strongest results com-
ing from the computer usage and output per hour
technology proxies.
In sum, we find strong evidence that the elimina-
tion of positions is more likely in high-tech industries,
consistent with the notion that job losses (and gains)
are more common in technologically dynamic indus-
tries. However, there is less consistent evidence of a23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
correlation between technology and other forms of
displacement, notably plant closings. Furthermore,
we find no support for the hypothesis that the tech-
nologydisplacement relationship disproportionately
affects low-skilled or older workers. These results are




Next, we report results on the success of dis-
placed workers in finding new employment. Approxi-
mately 79 percent of our displaced worker sample
report finding at least one new post-displacement job
by the DWS survey date. We explore whether workers
who were displaced due to technology had particular
difficulty reentering the labor force.
Table 5 reports the basic demographic findings
from our reemployment regressions. There are several
differences in these specifications relative to the dis-
placement regressions. First, obviously the depen-
dent variable is different. Individuals who find a job
post-displacement are set to one, and everyone who
is still jobless at the survey date is set to zero. There-
fore, if a derivative in table 5 is positive, it implies
that the characteristic is associated with a greater
likelihood of finding a new job. Second, the sample
includes only individuals who are displaced for one
of the three reasons in the 1986 to 1998 surveys.22
Third, recall that the displacement survey asks workers
whether they were displaced in any of the past three
years. Clearly, workers who have been laid off very
recently are less likely to have a job as of the survey
date than those displaced three years ago. Therefore,
we include a series of variables to keep track of how
many years ago displacement took place.23
The results show that older workers are more
likely to be unemployed or out of the labor force fol-
lowing a displacement. Moving from the 35 to 39 age
group to the 45 to 49 age group decreases the proba-
bility of finding a job by roughly 7.9 percentage points.
The decline increases by an additional 8.2 percentage
points by age 50 to 54 and a further 8.3 percentage
points by age 55 to 59. Finding reemployment after a
plant closing appears to be particularly difficult for
older workers. Likewise, less educated workers are
TABLE 4
Effect of technology on displacement, by age
Sample: Age 30–39 Age 40–49 Age 50–59
Sample size Sample size Sample size
All displacement
Computer usage –0.023* 0.008 32,791 –0.016* 0.010 35,228 –0.013* 0.003 24,879
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010)
Computer investment 0.013 0.080* 14,515 0.013 0.076* 14,773 –0.013 0.053* 10,379
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019)
MLR high-tech 0.038* 0.010* 33,030 0.033* 0.008 35,470 0.029* –0.007 25,036
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Output per hour 0.003* 0.005* 13,374 0.002* 0.004* 13,173 0.002* 0.003* 9,478
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total factor productivity –0.003 –0.003 7,184 –0.006 –0.006 7,157 –0.003 –0.003 5,439
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Position abolished
Computer usage 0.013* 0.018* 32,791 0.010* 0.017* 35,228 0.015* 0.020* 24,879
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Computer investment 0.013* 0.022* 14,515 0.004 0.011 14,773 0.008 0.020 10,379
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
MLR high-tech 0.004* 0.003 33,030 0.005* 0.002 35,470 0.008* 0.005 25,036
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Output per hour 0.0008* 0.0004 13,374 0.0008* 0.0006 13,173 0.002* 0.002* 9,478
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001)
Total factor productivity 0.002* 0.002* 7,184 0.001 0.001 7,157 0.000 0.000 5,439
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Includes major
industry controls no yes no yes no yes
*significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Partial derivatives are reported with standard errors in parentheses. See text and box 1 for an explanation. See table 2 and text for
details and sources of technology measures.24 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 5
Probability of reemployment, by reason
All Plant Slack Position
displacement closing work abolished
Age 35–39 –0.005 –0.023 0.012 0.004
(0.016) (0.026) (0.030) (0.033)
Age 40–44 –0.069* –0.091* –0.096* –0.016*
(0.017) (0.027) (0.034) (0.004)
Age 45–49 –0.084* –0.097* –0.102* –0.047*
(0.018) (0.028) (0.035) (0.036)
Age 50–54 –0.166* –0.208* –0.147* –0.127*
(0.019) (0.030) (0.037) (0.040)
Age 55–59 –0.249* –0.267* –0.235* –0.254*
(0.021) (0.031) (0.041) (0.044)
High school dropout –0.043* –0.069* –0.019 0.007
(0.014) (0.020) (0.027) (0.040)
Some college 0.022 0.050* 0.015 –0.012
(0.012) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024)
College graduate 0.074* 0.088* 0.058* 0.064*
(0.013) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022)
Black –0.094* –0.046 –0.125* –0.182*
(0.018) (0.025) (0.036) (0.041)
Hispanic –0.103* –0.095* –0.127* –0.092*
(0.022) (0.030) (0.042) (0.058)
Other race –0.066* –0.056 –0.070 –0.099
(0.030) (0.047) (0.053) (0.066)
Female –0.031* –0.015 –0.034 –0.070*
(0.010) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021)
1986 –0.086* –0.023 –0.198* –0.144*
(0.024) (0.034) (0.056) (0.051)
1988 –0.226* –0.198* –0.319* –0.200*
(0.026) (0.037) (0.059) (0.057)
1990 –0.243* –0.209* –0.309* –0.277*
(0.026) (0.038) (0.061) (0.052)
1992 –0.301* –0.223* –0.444* –0.337*
(0.025) (0.037) (0.055) (0.048)
1994 –0.093* –0.107* –0.147* –0.061
(0.021) (0.034) (0.050) (0.036)
1996 0.049* 0.070* 0.005 0.048





1 year since 0.107* 0.115* 0.124* 0.102*
displacement (0.012) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022)
 2 years since 0.190* 0.210* 0.214* 0.177*
displacement (0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017)
3 years since 0.207* 0.229* 0.236* 0.190*
displacement (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018)
Log likelihood –4,039 –1,975 –1,131 –901
Sample size 9,152 4,756 2,301 2,095
*significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Partial derivatives are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
See text and box 1 for an explanation. See table 2 and text for details and
sources of technology measures.
more likely to remain out of work. High
school dropouts are 4.3 percentage points
less likely to have a post-displacement
job than high school graduates, while
college graduates are 7.4 percentage
points more likely to have a post-displace-
ment job than high school graduates. As
with older workers, those with less edu-
cation have particular difficulty finding
reemployment when displaced due to a
plant closing.
Table 6 presents our results for the
five technology measures. Like the dis-
placement findings, the results vary
depending on the technology proxy em-
ployed. In the case of computer usage
and the MLR indicator, the two technol-
ogy measures that encompass the entire
economy, increases in technology de-
crease the likelihood of finding new em-
ployment when major industry trends are
controlled. On average, a 10 percentage
point increase in industry computer usage
decreases the chances of finding a new
job by 5.7 percentage points. Being in an
MLR high-tech industry decreases the
odds of finding a job post-displacement
by 3.0 percentage points.24 There is also
a negative and large relationship between
industry computer investment and reem-
ployment but this correlation is not sta-
tistically significant. The two productivity
measures exhibit no correlation with reem-
ployment likelihood when major industry
is controlled.
Table 7 reports the reemployment
results stratified by education. If there is
a bias towards hiring skilled workers in
high-technology firms, we would expect
to see larger, negative results for less
skilled workers, implying that such work-
ers are more likely to have difficulty find-
ing a new job post-displacement. This
may be because of high training costs,
which could increase the likelihood that
less skilled and older workers have to
switch industries or take pay cuts to
secure new employment. In fact, we find
that less educated workers are less likely
to find new employment after displace-
ment from MLR high-tech industries and
industries with higher computer usage.
But we find no such relationship for the25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
two productivity measures or the computer invest-
ment variable.25
Finally, table 8 stratifies the sample based on the
age of the worker. We see some evidence that older
workers are more prone to employment problems when
displacement occurs in high-technology industries.
This result applies to the computer usage and TFP
technology variables. Here, the difference in finding
a new job between workers in their thirties and those
in their fifties is substantial, on the order of 12 percent-
age points from a 10 percentage point increase in indus-
try computer usage and 5 percentage points from a 10
percentage point increase in TFP. We do not find such
an age difference for the MLR high-tech indicator.26
The results do not change when we restrict the
sample to the 1990s surveys or to workers who were
full-time when they were displaced. Tests with sam-
ples of age groups 50 to 54 and 55 to 59 are inconclu-
sive because of small sample sizes.
In sum, our preferred measures of technology,
the computer usage variable and the MLR high-tech
indicator, show that increases in technology decrease
the likelihood of finding new employment post-displace-
ment. Less skilled and older workers appear to have
more difficulty finding a new job after displacement
in high computer usage industries. These results
point to the importance of education and training in
reducing the uncertainty associated with job loss.
Conclusion
This article seeks to fill a gap in the displacement
literature by measuring the effect of technological
change on displacement and post-displacement reem-
ployment. Our results provide evidence that industry-
specific technological innovation affects the probability
of displacement and reemployment. Although the
results are somewhat sensitive to the measure of
technology employed, our preferred technology
measurescomputer usage and a measure based on
TABLE 6




Computer usage –0.020 –0.057* 9,069
(0.021) (0.026)
Computer investment 0.020 –0.054 4,941
(0.047) (0.067)
MLR high-tech –0.038* –0.030* 9,105
(0.013) (0.014)
Output per hour –0.008* –0.003 5,098
(0.003) (0.004)
Total factor productivity –0.009 –0.009 3,405
(0.010) (0.010)
Includes major
industry controls no yes
*significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Partial derivatives are reported with standard errors
in parentheses. See text and box 1 for an explanation. See
table 2 and text for details and sources of technology
measures.
TABLE 7
Effect of technology on displacement, by education
No college degree College graduates
Sample size Sample size
All displacement
Computer usage –0.023 –0.062* 7,354 –0.005 –0.022 1,721
(0.024) (0.029) (0.033) (0.043)
Computer investment 0.056 0.017 3,938 –0.029 –0.154 828
(0.037) (0.081) (0.083) (0.153)
MLR high-tech –0.047* –0.038* 7,378 –0.013 –0.009 1,733
(0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022)
Output per hour –0.011* –0.006 4,402 0.005 0.008 698
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Total factor productivity –0.009 –0.009 2,972 0.000 0.000 434
(0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022)
Includes major
industry controls no yes no yes
*significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Partial derivatives are reported with standard errors in parentheses. See text and box 1 for an explanation.
See table 2 and text for details and sources of technology measures.26 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 8
Effect of technology on reemployment, by age
Age 30–39 Age 40–49 Age 50–59
Sample size Sample size Sample size
All displacement
Computer usage 0.030 –0.014 3,579 –0.031 –0.050 3,165 –0.075 –0.134* 2,325
(0.036) (0.046) (0.045) (0.055) (0.053) (0.062)
Computer investment 0.030 –0.050 1,916 0.023 –0.115 1,707 0.061 0.051 1,318
(0.073) (0.118) (0.105) (0.120) (0.107) (0.121)
MLR high-tech –0.061* –0.046 3,595 –0.029 –0.009 3,176 –0.038 –0.043 2,336
(0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.034)
Output per hour –0.008 –0.004 1,985 –0.006 –0.001 1,755 –0.016* –0.011 1,359
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Total factor productivity 0.011 0.011 1,296 0.012 0.012 1,150 –0.049* –0.049* 959
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Includes major
industry controls no yes no yes no yes
*significant at the 5 percent level.
Notes: Partial derivatives are reported with standard errors in parentheses. See text and box 1 for an explanation.
See table 2 and text for details and sources of technology measures.
R&D employeeswhich cover virtually the entire
economy, show consistent effects of technology on
displacement and reemployment. We also explore the
impact of technology on less skilled and older work-
ers, groups that might be particularly prone to dis-
placement due to technological innovation. While we
find no evidence that the technologydisplacement
relationship disproportionately affects low-skilled or
older workers, there is some evidence that less skilled
and older workers are more likely to have difficulty
finding a new job after being displaced from a high-
technology industry.
We plan to conduct further research to under-
stand why the results vary across technological mea-
sures. This includes improving our current variables
by addressing measurement problems and looking at
other measures that might be related to technology.
In addition, we aim to study other unexplored outcomes
relating to the post-displacement experience. In par-
ticular, are high-tech displaced workers more likely to
face cuts in wages or hours worked after displacement?
Do these workers switch industries (and face the atten-
dant wage losses)? Are differences in the time it takes
displaced workers to find new employment related to
the technological level of their industry? Exploration
of these issues will help us to further understand the
role, if any, of technology in involuntary job loss.27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
APPENDIX 1: Unweighted descriptive statistics
Panel A.  The samplea
Unweighted means
Displaced workers Not displaced workers
Age 30–35 0.194 0.156
Age 35–39 0.201 0.193
Age 40–44 0.185 0.201
Age 45–49 0.164 0.181
Age 50–54 0.137 0.151
Age 55–59 0.119 0.119
High school dropout 0.165 0.090
High school graduate 0.413 0.365
Some college 0.232 0.238




Other race 0.028 0.034
Female 0.382 0.429
Reemployed (all displaced workers) 0.785
Reemployed (displaced 2+ years prior to DWS) 0.882
Sample size 9,207 84,929
Panel B.  Technology proxies
Number
of 3 digit Standard
industries Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Computer usageb 228 0.447 0.230 0.000 0.971
Computer investmentc 119 0.108 0.120 0.002 0.682
MLR high-techd 244 0.107 0.309 0 1
Output per houre 110 1.700 1.932 -2.800 6.400
NBER TFPf 75 0.579 0.887 -2.200 3.053
aThis is the sample from the displacement probit that uses the computer usage technology variable
(table 2, row 1). Other samples vary according to industries and years used.
bComputer usage is the fraction of workers that use a computer keyboard and is calculated from
the 1993 October CPS supplement.
cComputer investment is the share of investment in computer equipment and is from the 1992
Census of Industries.
dThe Monthly Labor Review’s (MLR) high-tech industries is from Luker and Lyons (1997).
eGrowth in output per hour is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It is averaged over 1987 to 1996.
fGrowth in total factor productivity (TFP) is from the NBER manufacturing productivity database.
It is averaged over 1980 to 1994.28 Economic Perspectives
1For a summary of the training literature, see LaLonde (1995).
2There also may be an issue of skill depreciation due to long-
term unemployment. Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate skills
decline by 30 percent per year of unemployment for white-
collar workers and 10 percent per year for blue-collar workers.
3Carrington (1993) finds that earnings losses are dependent on
local, industry, and occupational labor market conditions.
4Many economists believe that technological change has fun-
damentally altered the structure of employment and wages;
technology is often described as the most likely factor in the
increased demand for high-skilled workers. Researchers have
linked this critical change with increases in the return to a year
of education and the rise of income inequality during the 1980s
(Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Berman,
Bound, and Griliches, 1994; Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998).
5See Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987), Berman, Bound, and
Griliches (1994), and Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997).
Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) show a correlation between
high-skill employment and technological implementation in
manufacturing plants, but also show that higher tech firms
employed more high-skilled workers before new technologies
were introduced.
6Abraham (1997). For details on the debriefing, see Esposito
and Fisher (1998).
7Farber (1997) only uses displacement that occurs in the last
three years of the five-year intervals. He adjusts for differences
that might still arise from workers with multiple job losses by
using Panel Study of Income Dynamics data to quantify the
frequency of job loss patterns and adjust rates in the DWS to
offset them.
8We do not use the 1983 tenure supplement because it is missing
industry codes.
9All measures are calculated at the three-digit standard industrial
classification (SIC) or census industry classification (CIC) level.
10However, future work will incorporate these variables, as well
as an aggregate index that combines all of the measures into
one variable.
11The lone exception is the computer usage variable, which is
available in 1984, 1989, and 1993. We only use the 1993 data,
but, in future research, we will use the additional years as well
as look at the growth in computer usage as a proxy for techno-
logical innovation.
12The data are reported at the four-digit level; we aggregate to
the three-digit level using employment levels as weights.
13For example, the only three-digit sector from the finance,
insurance, and real estate industry is commercial banks
(SIC code 602). Only eight of 53 SIC service sectors are
included.
14Table 1 of Luker and Lyons (1997) lists the 28 industries that
are deemed high-technology.
15SIC code 737, CIC code 740.
16CIC code 740 is in the 90th percentile of the computer usage
and computer investment technology measures and is coded as
high-tech in the MLR high-tech indicator. It is not included in
the TFP and output per hour data.
17An alternative method for computing age and skill variation
is to interact the technology measure with the age or education
variables. This method restricts all coefficients in equation 1
to be the same, whereas the stratification method allows, say,
the effect of gender to vary across age or education groups.
Results using interaction specifications are available upon
request. We also look at age and education interactions together
(that is, older, less skilled workers versus younger, less skilled
workers). These results are available upon request.
18The 1994 displacement survey is not used because it cannot
be matched to a tenure supplement.
19Stratifying the sample by education shows small differences
in the age coefficients across education groups. The age 5059
derivative is 0.018 (0.005) for high school dropouts, 0.015
(0.003) for high school graduates, 0.023 (0.004) for some
college, and 0.022 (0.004) for college graduates.
20It appears that at least some of the variation is due to sample
composition. For instance, restricting the sample of industries
to those with TFP data (that is, manufacturing), changes the
derivatives on other technology measures.
21In addition, we estimated the impact of technology on older,
college graduates and older, non-college graduate workers. Gen-
erally, this additional interaction was not statistically significant
at the 5 percent level for any of the technology measures.
22Unlike the displacement regressions, the 1994 survey is in-
cluded in this analysis. This is because we do not have to
match a tenure survey to a displacement survey in the reem-
ployment analysis. Since no tenure survey is within a year of
the 1994 displacement survey, it was dropped for the dis-
placement analysis.
23The derivatives are relative to the base case of 0 years,
which occurs if the year of displacement is equal to the year
of the survey.
24Only the computer usage derivative remains significant if we
look at workers displaced due to position abolishment.
25Only the computer usage derivative for workers without a
college degree remains significant if we look at workers
displaced due to position abolishment.
26Only the computer usage derivative for workers in their for-
ties remains significant if we look at workers displaced due to
position abolishment.
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